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Abstract—Crowdsourced wireless community networks can effectively alleviate the limited coverage issue of Wi-Fi access points
(APs), by encouraging individuals (users) to share their private residential Wi-Fi APs with others. In this paper, we provide a
comprehensive economic analysis for such a crowdsourced network, with the particular focus on the users’ behavior analysis and the
community network operator’s pricing design. Specifically, we formulate the interactions between the network operator and users as a
two-layer Stackelberg model, where the operator determining the pricing scheme in Layer I, and then users determining their Wi-Fi
sharing schemes in Layer II. First, we analyze the user behavior in Layer II via a two-stage membership selection and network access
game, for both small-scale networks and large-scale networks. Then, we design a partial price differentiation scheme for the operator
in Layer I, which generalizes both the complete price differentiation scheme and the single pricing scheme (i.e., no price
differentiation). We show that the proposed partial pricing scheme can achieve a good tradeoff between the revenue and the
implementation complexity. Numerical results demonstrate that when using the partial pricing scheme with only two prices, we can
increase the operator’s revenue up to 124.44% comparing with the single pricing scheme, and can achieve an average of 80% of the
maximum operator revenue under the complete price differentiation scheme.
Index Terms—Mobile Crowdsourcing, Wireless Community Network, Economic Analysis, Price Differentiation
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
Global mobile data traffic grows rapidly nowadays, with an
unprecedented anticipated annual growth rate of 57% from
2014 to 2019 [1]. The capacity of cellular networks, however,
increases much slower than the mobile data traffic. Hence,
Wi-Fi networks are playing an increasingly important role
in bridging such a gap by carrying a significant amount of
mobile data traffic [2]–[6]. The fast development of Wi-Fi
technology is due to several reasons such as low deploying
costs of Wi-Fi access points (APs) and high Wi-Fi data
transmission rates. However, the large-scale deployment of
a Wi-Fi network is often restricted by the limited coverage of
each single Wi-Fi AP (typically tens of meters indoors and
hundreds of meters outdoors [7]), which is much smaller
than the coverage of a cellular tower. Hence, it is very ex-
pensive for a single operator to deploy enough Wi-Fi APs to
entirely cover a large area such as a city or a nation.
The crowdsourced wireless community network turns
out as a promising solution to expand the Wi-Fi coverage
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with a low cost. The key idea is to encourage individuals
(users) to share their owned private Wi-Fi APs with each
other, hence aggregating/crowdsourcing the coverage and
capacity of private Wi-Fi APs [8]–[15]. By crowdsourcing
millions of Wi-Fi APs already installed by users, this new
type of network can reduce or even remove new Wi-Fi
installations for the network operator. Meanwhile, users can
also benefit from joining such a community network, as they
can use not only their own APs when staying at home, but
also others’ APs when traveling to corresponding locations.
Clearly, the success of such a crowdsourced network largely
depends on the active participations and contributions of
many individual Wi-Fi owners, and hence requires a careful
design of economic incentive mechanism.
One prominent commercial example of wireless com-
munity networks is FON [16], which has more than 20
millions member Wi-Fi APs globally. In FON, the operator
incentivizes Wi-Fi AP owners to share their private APs by
using two different incentive schemes, corresponding to two
kinds of memberships: Linus and Bill. As a Linus, a user
can get free Wi-Fi access within the community network
coverage. As a Bill, a user can earn money from sharing
his AP with other users. Moreover, a user who does not
own a Wi-Fi AP can still access the FON network as an
Alien, by purchasing Wi-Fi passes from the operator. Despite
the commercial success of wireless community networks,
however, there is little work performing the comprehensive
economic analysis for such a new network scheme.
1.2 Model and Problem Formulation
In this work, we consider a wireless community network
launched by a FON-like network operator. As in FON, there
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Figure 1. Wireless Community Network Model
are two types of mobile users in the network: subscribers
and Aliens, each traveling (roaming) randomly according
to certain mobility pattern. Each subscriber owns a private
residential Wi-Fi AP at a fixed home location, and opens up
his AP for the access of other users. An Alien does not own a
Wi-Fi AP (hence does not contribute to the network), but can
access subscribers’ APs (when roaming to the corresponding
locations) with a certain fee. Figure 1 illustrates such a
wireless community network, where subscriber 1 (owner of
AP 1) stays at home and connects to his own AP, subscribers
2 and 3 travel to subscriber 4’s home location and connect
to AP 4, and Alien 5 travels to subscriber 2’s home location
and connects to AP 2. Subscriber 4 and Alien 6 are at areas
without Wi-Fi coverage, hence no available connections.
Similar as FON [17], the network operator offers two
different memberships for subscribers, i.e., Linus or Bill,
corresponding to two different incentive schemes:
• As a Linus, a subscriber contributes his AP without
any monetary compensation, and as compensation,
he can use other APs free of charge;
• As a Bill, a subscriber needs to pay for using other
APs (according to a pricing scheme specified by the
operator), and can obtain a portion of the revenue
collected at his own AP by the network operator.
Moreover, an Alien has to pay for using any AP in the net-
work (according to a usage-based pricing scheme specified
by the operator), as he does not contribute to the network.
The payments of Alien and Bill (for using other APs) are
often time usage-based [17] (i.e., proportional to the Wi-Fi
connection time).
The network operator and the users (subscribers and
Aliens) interact in the following order. First, the operator
announces the pricing scheme, i.e., the usage-based price
(charged to Bills and Aliens) at each AP. Second, each
subscriber chooses his membership type for a given time
period (e.g., six months), considering his mobility (travel)
pattern within that time period as well as his demand
and evaluation for network access during travel. Third,
when travelling to a particular AP’s location in a particular
time slot (e.g., five minutes), each user further decides his
network access time on that AP in that time slot, taking the
network congestion into consideration. In this work, we will
study the above operator pricing design and user decision
problems systematically.
1.3 Solution and Contribution
We formulate the interactions between the operator and
users as a two-layer Stackelberg model, where the operator
Layer I: Operator pricing design
Layer II: Users behavior response
Stage I: Subscribers membership selection
Stage II: Users network access decision
Figure 2. Stackelberg Model of the Operator and Users Interactions
decides the pricing scheme in Layer I and subscribers decide
the membership selection and network access in Layer II,
as illustrated in Figure 2. We want to emphasize that the
operator’s pricing decision and the subscribers’ member-
ship selection decisions are made once at the beginning
of each time period (consisting of many time slots) and
remain unchanged during the whole period; howerver, the
subscribers’ network access decisions are updated in each
time slot, according to their membership selections and
the operator’s pricing scheme, as well as the real network
congestions of their roaming APs. Next we explain the
challenges for solving the two stage problems and our
corresponding contributions.
First, we study the operator’s decision problem in Layer
I. To extract the maximum surplus from users, the operator
can implement a complete price differentiation scheme, i.e.,
charging one price per AP, which will lead to a high im-
plementation complexity and potential customer aversion
[18]. To balance the revenue and complexity, we propose a
partial price differentiation scheme, where APs are divided
into multiple groups according to their attributes such as
the location popularity and the owner’s network access
evaluation, and the operator charges different prices to
different groups. Such a partial price differentiation scheme
includes both complete price differentiation scheme and sin-
gle pricing scheme as special cases, but is much challenging
to design than the latter two.
Next, we study the user decision problem in Layer II.
As will be shown later in Section 3, to make the best
decision, the computational complexity (for each user) to
reach the decision increases exponentially with the number
of users. Thus, in practice, users may not be able to make the
fully rational decisions due to the bounded rationality [19],1
especially in a large-scale network with many users (which
is more general). To this end, we propose an approximate
Stackelberg model for large-scale networks, and understand
the system equilibrium when users make their decisions
according to approximately best responses.
As far as we know, this is the first work that makes the
comprehensive game-theoretic and economic analysis for a
crowdsourced wireless community network. We summarize
the key contributions of this work as follows.
• Model Novelty: Our model is novel and captures sev-
eral key practical issues, such as user mobility pat-
tern, network access evaluation, demand response,
1. Bounded rationality is the concept that the rationality of decision
makers is limited by the cognitive limitations of their minds [19].
3and network congestion effect. These issues have
not been fully considered before in the context of
wireless community networks.
• Small-Scale Network Analysis: We propose a Stackel-
berg model to capture the interactions between the
operator and users in the crowdsourced wireless
community networks for small networks. We design
a partial price differentiation scheme, which includes
the complete price differentiation scheme and single
pricing scheme as special cases, to help the operator
achieve a balance between revenue and implementa-
tion complexity.
• Large-Scale Network Analysis: We propose an approxi-
mate Stackelberg model for the large-scale network
with a large number of users, where users are
bounded rational due to the limited computation ca-
pability and make the approximately best responses.
We analyze the user behavior and the operator pric-
ing design in the large-scale network systematically.
The rest of the paper is organized as below. In Section
2, we present the model. In Section 3, we analyze the users’
game in Layer II. In Section 4, we analyze the operator’s
pricing design in Layer I. In Section 5, we analyze the
user behavior and operator pricing design in large-scale
networks. We present simulation results and derive engi-
neering insights in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
1.4 Literature Review
There are several closely related studies in wireless commu-
nity networks, regarding incentive issues [11], the network
expansion and interactions with traditional ISP [12], [13],
and the pricing mechanism design [14], [15]. Camponovo
et al. in [11] concluded based on surveys that getting free
Internet access from other members and revenue sharing are
the two main incentives for users to join the FON network in
Switzerland. Manshaei et al. in [12] modeled a user’s payoff
as a function of the subscription fee and network coverage,
and studied the evolution dynamics of wireless commu-
nity networks. Biczok et al. in [13] studied the competition
and cooperation among users, wireless community network
operator, and ISPs. Afrasiabi et al. in [14] proposed a low
introductory price policy to promote the service adoption.
Mazloumian et al. in [15] proposed a fair pricing, which is
proportional to users’ predicted network coverage.
In this work, we focus on the user behavior analysis
and the operator pricing design in a crowdsourced wireless
community network. Neither problem has been systemati-
cally studied in the existing literature. Our model not only
captures the Internet access sharing and revenue sharing,
but also incorporates the impact of users mobility and the
network congestion effect. This makes our model more
comprehensive and practically significant.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 The Network Model
As illustrated in Figure 1, we consider a crowdsourced wire-
less community network consisting of a setKS = {1, . . . ,K}
of subscriber (users), each owning a private residential Wi-Fi
AP, and a set KA = {K + 1, ...,K + KA} of Alien (users)
Table 1
A Summary of Three User Types
User Type Pay for using other APs Paid by sharing his AP
Linus No No
Bills Yes Yes
Aliens Yes Not Applicable
without owning any Wi-Fi AP. Each subscriber is associated
with a “home”, corresponding to the location of his Wi-Fi
AP. Hence, Ks also represents the set of AP locations. For
convenience, we refer to the set of all subscribers and Aliens
as user set, denoted by KU = KS
⋃KA. Subscribers open
their private Wi-Fi APs for the access of other users, hence
constitute a community network.
Each subscriber can choose two different memberships:
Linus and Bill, corresponding to different incentive schemes.
Specifically, as a Linus, a subscriber contributes his AP
without any monetary compensation, and can use other APs
free of charge. As a Bill, a subscriber needs to pay for using
other APs, and can obtain a portion of the revenue collected
at his own AP by the network operator. Moreover, each
Alien has to pay for using any AP in the network, as he does
not contribute to the network. For clarity, we summarize the
properties of these user types in Table 1.
We consider the operation in a long time period (e.g.,
six months), which is divided into T time slots (e.g., five
minutes per time slot). For notational convenience, we nor-
malize the length of each time slot to be one. We consider
a quasi-static mobility model, where each user moves ran-
domly across time slots, and remains at the same location
within one time slot. Let ηi,j , i ∈ KU, j ∈ KS denote the
stationary probability that a user i ∈ KU appears at the
location of AP j ∈ KS in any time slot, and ηi,0 denote
the probability that user i appears at a location that is not
covered by any Wi-Fi AP in the community network. We
further define ηi = [ηi,0, ηi,1, . . . , ηi,K ] as user i’s mobility
pattern. Obviously,
∑K
j=0 ηi,j = 1, ∀i ∈ KU.
Furthermore, to ensure a subscriber’s Quality of Service
(QoS) at his home location, we assume that each subscriber
splits the bandwidth of his AP into two separate channels
(similar as the current practice of FON [16]): a private
channel for serving himself, and a public channel for serving
other users roaming at this location. Hence, roaming users’
communications will not interfere with a subscriber’s own
communication, and the network congestion only occurs
among roaming users on the public channel.
2.2 Multi-Stage Interactions
The operator and users interact in the following order.
First, the operator determines and announces the pricing
scheme at the beginning of the time period, which specifies
the Wi-Fi access price on each AP paid by Aliens and Bills
(except the AP owner), denoted by p = {pi,∀i ∈ KS}.
The operator’s goal is to choose a proper set of prices to
maximize the total revenue collected at all member APs.
Second, given the operator’s pricing scheme p =
{pi,∀i ∈ KS}, each subscriber i ∈ KS chooses his member-
ship xi ∈ {0, 1} for the entire period of T time slots, where
0 and 1 correspond to “Linus” and “Bill”, respectively. The
goal of each subscriber is to choose the best membership
4... ...slot  1 slot  2 ... slot  T
One Time Period
Time
Membership 
Selection 
Game
Stage I Stage II
Network Access Game (on each AP in each time slot)
Figure 3. Two-Stage Dynamic Game in Layer II (In each time slot, there
is a set of parallel network access games, each associated with an AP.)
that maximizes his expected payoff during the whole period
of T time slots, taking his mobility pattern and demand
(or evaluation) for network access as well as other users’
membership selections into consideration.
Third, given the operator’s pricing scheme p = {pi,∀i ∈
KS} and the subscribers’ membership selections x =
{xi,∀i ∈ KS}, each user (subscriber or Alien) further de-
cides the network usage in each time slot, i.e., the network
access time on the AP of his current location. When staying
at home, a subscriber uses his private channel exclusively,
and his network access decision is independent of other
users’ decisions. When accessing the Internet through an-
other subscriber’s AP, a user (subscriber or Alien) needs to
compete for the public channel with other users connecting
to the same AP (except the owner of that AP), hence his best
network access decision depends on other users’ decisions.
In this work, we will study the operator pricing design
problem and the user joint membership selection and net-
work access decision problem comprehensively.
2.3 Problem Formulation
We formulate the interactions between the operator and
the users as a two-layer Stackelberg model, as illustrated
in Figure 2. In Layer I, the operator acts as the leader and
optimizes the pricing scheme, based on his anticipation of
users’ responses (i.e., membership selection and network
access) to the pricing scheme. The operator announces the
pricing scheme to users at the beginning of each time period,
and the pricing scheme will not change throughout the
whole time period. In Layer II, the users act as the followers
and decide their membership selections and network access
decisions, given the operator’s pricing scheme.
Moreover, we formulate users’ joint membership selec-
tion and network access problem (in Layer II) as a two-
stage dynamic game, as illustrated in Figure 3. In Stage
I, subscribers participate in a membership selection game at
the beginning of each time period, where each subscriber
chooses his membership for the whole time period. In
Stage II, at each time slot, users travelling to the same AP
participate in a network access game, where each user decides
his network access time on that AP. Namely, each AP is
associated with a network access game at each time slot.
In this work, we consider both the small-scale and large-
scale networks. In practice, each user has the limited com-
putation capability, which may be enough for computing his
best decision in a small-scale network, while not enough in a
large-scale network. Hence, we assume that users will make
the approximately best responses in large-scale networks,
and hence are bounded rational. Namely, we propose an
approximate Stackelberg model for large-scale networks,
where users act in a bounded rational manner.
In what follows, we will study the Stackelberg game
by backward induction, starting from the users’ two-stage
dynamic game in Layer II (Section 3), and then moving
to the operator’s pricing design in Layer I (Section 4). We
will further study the approximate Stackelberg model with
bounded rational users in Section 5.
3 LAYER II: USER BEHAVIOR ANSLYSIS
In this section, we study the users’ two-stage dynamic game
(for small-scale networks) in Layer II, given the operator’s
pricing scheme. We analyze the game by backward induc-
tion. We will first analyze the network access game in Stage
II for each time slot and then analyze the membership
selection game in Stage I for the whole time period.
3.1 Stage II: Network Access Game on Each AP
We first study the network access game in Stage II (on each
AP in each time slot), given the subscribers’ membership
selections x = {xi,∀i ∈ KS} in Stage I and the operator’s
pricing scheme p = {pi,∀i ∈ KS} in Layer I. In this game,
each user decides the network access time on the AP at
his current location, aiming at maximizing his payoff in the
current time slot.
3.1.1 Network Access Game Formulation
Without loss of generality, we consider the network access
game on a particular AP k in a particular time slot t. Recall
that the length of each time slot is normalized to be one for
notational convenience.
The players of the game are all users traveling to AP
k (except the owner of AP k) in time slot t, denoted by
K(k, t) = KS(k, t)
⋃KA(k, t), where KS(k, t) and KA(k, t)
are the sets of subscribers and Aliens (at AP k and time
slot t), respectively. For notational convenience, we will
ignore the time index t, and hence write the player set as
K(k) = KS(k)
⋃KA(k) in the rest of this section, since we
stick on the operations in time slot t.
The strategy of each player i ∈ K(k) is to decide the
network access time σi,k ∈ [0, 1] on AP k in time slot t. We
denote the strategies of players in K(k) except i as σ−i,k =
{σj,k, j 6= i, j ∈ K(k)}. The payoff of player i is a function
of both his own strategy σi,k and other players’ strategies
σ−i,k, denoted by vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) (to be defined later).
More formally, the network access game on a particular
AP k (in time slot t) and the corresponding Nash equilib-
rium are defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Network Access Game on AP k).
• Players: the set K(k) of users traveling to AP k;
• Strategies: the network access time σi,k ∈ [0, 1] of each
user i ∈ K(k) on AP k;
• Payoffs: vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k), ∀i ∈ K(k).
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium). A Nash equilibrium of the
Network Access Game on AP k (in time slot t) is a profile σ∗k =
{σi,k,∀i ∈ K(k)} such that for each user i ∈ K(k),
vi,k(σ
∗
i,k,σ
∗
−i,k) ≥ vi,k(σi,k,σ∗−i,k), ∀σi,k ∈ [0, 1].
Note that the Nash equilibrium σ∗k depends on the
player set K(k), hence can be written as σ∗k(K(k)).
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3.1.2 Utility and Payoff Definition
Before analyzing the Nash equilibrium, we first define users’
utility and payoff functions.
Utility: The utility captures a user’s satisfaction for ac-
cessing the Internet for a certain amount of time. Due to the
diminishing marginal returns principle [20], [21], we assume
the utility function is increasing and concave. As a concrete
example, we define the utility of user i ∈ K(k) on AP k as
ui(σi,k,σ−i,k) = ρi log(1 + r¯i,k(σ−i,k) · σi,k), (1)
where ρi is user i’s network access evaluation, characterizing
user i’s valuation of data consumption. Here, r¯i,k(σ−i,k) is
the expected data rate that user i can achieve on AP k, which
is a decreasing function of other users’ network access times
σ−i,k on AP k. Intuitively, with more users accessing AP k’s
public channel simultaneously, user i’s achieved data rate
will decrease due to the increased congestion. Obviously,
r¯i,k(σ−i,k) ·σi,k denotes the total expected data amount that
user i consumes on AP k (in time slot t).
Next, we derive the concrete form of the user i’s expected
data rate r¯i,k(σ−i,k) on AP k. Let R¯(n) denote the average
data rate of a Wi-Fi user when n users are connecting to the
Wi-Fi AP simultaneously. Let Pi,k(n) denote the probability
that n other users (except i) connect to AP k. Then, user i’s
expected data rate r¯i,k(σ−i,k) can be calculated as follows:
r¯i,k(σ−i,k) =
|K(k)|−1∑
n=0
Pi,k(n) · R¯(n+ 1). (2)
According to IEEE 802.11g standard [22], we have:
R¯(n) =
τ τ¯n−1L
τ¯nTb + [(1− τ¯n)− nτ τ¯n−1]Tc + nτ τ¯n−1Ts , (3)
where τ is the average successful probability of contention
(and τ¯ = 1 − τ ), L is the average payload length, Tb is
the length of a backoff slot, Tc is the length of a collision
slot, and Ts is the length of a successful slot. Figure 4
illustrates an example of R¯(·) under IEEE 802.11g standard
(reproduced from [22], with parameters τ = 0.0765, L =
8192, Tb = 28µs, and Tc = Ts = 85.7 + L/54µs). The
decreasing data rate per user is due to both the reduced
resource per user and the waste of resources caused by
congestion among users.
For simplicity, we assume that if a user i decides to access
the channel with a certain time σi,k, he will spread this
access time randomly and uniformly across the entire time
slot. Recall that the length of a time slot is normalized to
1. Hence, the probability that user i connects to AP k in
an infinitely small time interval within the time slot is σi,k.
Thus, Pi,k(n), n = 0, 1, ..., |K(k)| − 1, follow the binomial
distribution (with a total of |K(k)| trials and a success
probability σj,k for each trial j ∈ K(k) \ {i}). Formally,
Pi,k(n) =
∑
Kn∈Kn(k)
 ∏
j∈Kn
σj,k ·
∏
j∈K(k)\{i}\Kn
(1− σj,k)
 ,
where Kn denotes an arbitrary subset of K(k) with n users
(except i), and Kn(k) denotes the set of all possible Kn.
Obviously,
∏
j∈Kn σj,k denotes the probability that all users
in Kn are connecting to AP k, and
∏
j∈K(k)\{i}\Kn(1− σj,k)
denotes the probability that all other users (except user i
and those in Kn) are not connecting to AP k.
Payoff: The payoff of each user i ∈ K(k) is defined as the
difference between the utility and the payment. Specifically,
if user i is a Linus (i.e., i ∈ KS(k) and xi = 0), he does
not need to pay for his network usage on AP k. Hence, the
payoff of a Linus-type user i on AP k, denoted by vLi,k, is the
same as his utility defined in (1), i.e.,
vLi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) = ui(σi,k,σ−i,k). (4)
If user i is a Bill (i.e., i ∈ KS(k) and xi = 1) or Alien (i.e.,
i ∈ KA(k)), he needs to pay for his network usage on AP k,
and the payment is proportional to his network access time
σi,k. Hence, the payoff of a Bill-type or Alien user i, denoted
by vBi,k, is the difference between utility and payment, i.e.,
vBi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) = ui(σi,k,σ−i,k)− pkσi,k. (5)
Based on the above, we can summarize the payoff of user
i ∈ K(k) in the Network Access Game (on AP k) as follows:
vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) =
vLi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k), if i ∈ KS(k) and xi = 0;
vBi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k), if i ∈ KS(k) and xi = 1;
vBi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k), if i ∈ KA(k).
(6)
3.1.3 Nash Equilibrium Analysis
Now we study the Nash equilibrium of the above Network
Access Game (on AP k).
Given all other users’ strategies, a user’s best response is
the strategy that maximizes his payoff. The Nash equilib-
rium is a strategy profile where each user’s strategy is the
best response to other users’ strategies.
Lemma 1. If user i is a Linus, his best response in the Network
Access Game on AP k is
σ∗i,k = 1, (7)
regardless of other users’ strategies.
Lemma 2. If user i is a Bill or an Alien, his best response in the
Network Access Game on AP k is
σ∗i,k = min
{
1,max
{
ρi
pk
− 1
r¯i,k(σ−i,k)
, 0
}}
, (8)
which is a function of other users’ strategies σ−i,k.
We next illustrate the existence of the Nash equilibrium
in the Network Access Game.
Theorem 1. There exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the
Network Access Game on AP k.
6Now we discuss the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
in the Network Access Game on AP k.
Proposition 1. In a Network Access Game with two players, the
Nash equilibrium is unique if R¯(1)−R¯(2)
(R¯(2))2
< 1.
Note that the condition in Proposition 1 is always satis-
fied for practical WiFi systems given in [22]. For the cases
with more than two players, however, the uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium depends on system parameters in a more
complicated fashion. Please refer to the appendix for more
detailed discussions. We further propose a best response
update algorithm in the appendix, which is guaranteed to
linearly converge to the Nash equilibrium under the same
condition for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Stage I: Membership Selection Game
Now we study the subscribers’ membership selection game
in Stage I, given the operator’s pricing scheme p = {pi,∀i ∈
KS}. In this stage, each subscriber i ∈ KS decides his
membership type xi ∈ {0, 1} (i.e., Linus or Bill) at the
beginning of the period, aiming at maximizing the overall
expected payoff that he can achieve in all T time slots. Note
that an Alien i ∈ KA cannot choose his type, as he has no
Wi-Fi AP and does not contribute to the network.
3.2.1 Membership Selection Game Formulation
In the Membership Selection Game, players are subscribers
in the set KS. The strategy of each player i ∈ KS is to decide
his membership xi ∈ {0, 1}, with xi = 0 and 1 denoting
Linus and Bill, respectively. We denote the strategies of all
players except i by x−i = {xj , j 6= i, j ∈ KS}. The overall
payoff of a player i is sum of the total expected payoff on
all APs that he may travel to and the total expected revenue
that he may collect at his own AP (if choosing to be a Bill)
during T slots. It is a function of his own strategy xi and
other players’ strategies x−i, denoted by Vi(xi,x−i).
Formally, the Membership Selection Game and the cor-
responding Nash equilibrium are defined as follows. Note
that the Nash equilibria in Stage II (Definition 2) and Stage I
(Definition 4) together form a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE) of the whole game.
Definition 3 (Membership Selection Game).
• Players: the set KS of subscribers.
• Strategies: xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ KS.
• Payoffs: Vi(xi,x−i), ∀i ∈ KS.
Definition 4 (Nash Equilibrium). A Nash equilibrium of the
Membership Selection Game is a profile x∗ = {x∗i , i ∈ KS} such
that for each subscriber i ∈ KS,
Vi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ Vi(xi,x∗−i), ∀xi ∈ {0, 1}.
3.2.2 Payoff Definition
Before analyzing Nash equilibrium, we first calculate each
subscriber’s overall expected payoff in the whole period.
Total expected payoff: A subscriber’s overall expected
payoff consists of (i) the total expected payoff on all APs
that he may travel to and (ii) the total expected revenue that
he may collect on his own AP (if choosing to be a Bill). We
first calculate the total expected payoff of each subscriber
(on all APs that he may travel to), which depends on his
mobility pattern. Recall that the mobility of a subscriber i is
characterized by the probabilities of travelling to different
APs, i.e., ηi = [ηi,0, ηi,1, . . . , ηi,K ], where ηi,k is the prob-
ability of subscriber i travelling to AP k, and ηi,0 is the
probability of subscriber i travelling to an area that is not
covered by any AP in the network. We calculate subscriber
i’s expected payoffs (per time slot) when staying at home
and when roaming outside, respectively.
(a) When staying at home (with a probability ηi,i), subscriber
i communicates over the private channel of AP i and does
not interfere with other users. Hence his expected payoff,
denoted by Vi,i(xi,x−i), is
Vi,i(xi,x−i) = ρi · log(1 + r¯i,i · 1),
where constant r¯i,i corresponds to the average achieved
data rate. The product term r¯i,i · 1 implies that user i will
access the Internet during the entire time slot.
(b) When traveling to AP k 6= i (with a probability ηi,k),
subscriber i needs to compete over the public channel with
other users (except k) travelling to AP k at the same time (in
the Network Access Game).
Suppose that a setM(k) of other users (except i and k)
are travelling to AP k at the same time. That is, the game
player set in the Network Access Game on AP k is K(k) =
M(k)⋃{i}. For more clarity, let us rewrite the equilibrium
payoff of subscriber i on AP k, i.e., vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) defined
in (6), as vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k|M(k)), when competing with a set
M(k) of other users (in the Network Access Game on AP k).
Hence, the expected payoff of subscriber i on AP k is
Vi,k(xi,x−i) =
∑
M(k)∈K−{i,k}
φ(M(k))vi,k(σ∗i,k,σ∗−i,k|M(k)),
where φ(M(k)) is the probability that a set M(k) of users
are travelling to AP k, (σ∗i,k,σ
∗
−i,k) is the corresponding
equilibrium of the Network Access Game, and K−{i,k} is
the power set of KU \ {i, k}, i.e., the set of all subsets of
KU \ {i, k}. The probability φ(M(k)) is given by
φ(M(k)) =
∏
j∈M(k)
ηj,k ·
∏
j∈KU\{i,k}\M(k)
(1− ηj,k),
where
∏
j∈M(k) ηj,k denotes the probability that all users in
M(k) are travelling to AP k, and∏j∈KU\{i,k}\M(k)(1−ηj,k)
denotes the probability that all other users (except users i,
k, and those inM(k)) are not travelling to AP k.
(c) When traveling to an area that is not covered by any AP
(with a probability ηi,0), the expected payoff of subscriber i,
denoted by Vi,0(xi,x−i), is
Vi,0(xi,x−i) = 0.
Based on the above, the total expected payoff of sub-
scriber i (on all APs that he may travel to during the whole
period of T time slots) is
V †i (xi,x−i) = T ·
K∑
k=0
ηi,k · Vi,k(xi,x−i). (9)
Total expected revenue: Next, we calculate the total
expected revenue that each subscriber i may collect on his
own AP. Specifically, if choosing to be a Linus, subscriber i
obtains a zero revenue.If choosing to be a Bill, subscriber i
obtains a fixed portion δ of the revenue collected at his AP.
Suppose that a set K(i) of other users (except i) are
travelling to AP i. That is, the player set in the Network
7Access Game on AP i is K(i). Then, the Nash equilibrium
in the Network Access Game on AP i can be written as
{σ∗j,i(K(i)),∀j ∈ K(i)}. (10)
Recall that the revenue collected on each AP is the total
payment of all Aliens and Bills accessing that AP. Hence,
the total revenue collected on AP i is
Πi(x−i,K(i)) =∑
j∈K(i)⋂KA
pi · σ∗j,i(K(i)) +
∑
j∈K(i)⋂KS
xj · pi · σ∗j,i(K(i)),
where the first term is the payment of Aliens, and the second
term is the payment of Bills. Hence, the total expected
payment of Bills and Aliens on AP i is
Π¯i(x−i) =
∑
K(i)∈K−i
φ(K(i)) ·Πi(x−i,K(i)),
where φ(K(i)) is the probability that a set K(i) of users are
travelling to AP i, and K−i is the power set of KU \ {i}. The
probability φ(K(i)) is given by
φ(K(i)) =
∏
j∈K(i)
ηj,i ·
∏
j∈KU\{i}\K(i)
(1− ηj,i). (11)
Based on the above, the total expected revenue that a
subscriber i can achieve at his own AP (during the whole
time period of T time slots) is
V ‡i (xi,x−i) = T · xi · δ · Π¯i(x−i). (12)
Overall payoff: Combining the total expected payoff in
(9) and the total expected revenue in (12), the overall payoff
of each subscriber in the Membership Selection Game is
Vi(xi,x−i) = V
‡
i (xi,x−i) + V
†
i (xi,x−i)
= T ·
(
xi · δ · Π¯i(x−i) +
K∑
k=0
ηi,k · Vi,k(xi,x−i)
)
.
(13)
3.2.3 Nash Equilibrium Analysis
A subscriber i will make the membership decision to max-
imize his overall payoff defined in (13). Specifically, he will
choose to be a Linus if Vi(0,x−i) > Vi(1,x−i), and choose
to be a Bill otherwise. For notational convenience, we denote
fi(x−i) as the gap between Vi(1,x−i) and Vi(0,x−i):
fi(x−i) = Vi(1,x−i)− Vi(0,x−i). (14)
Hence, subscriber i will choose to be a Linus (xi = 0) if
fi(x−i) < 0, and choose to be a Bill (xi = 1) if fi(x−i) ≥ 0.
Mathematically, this is equivalent to choosing xi from {0, 1},
such that the following condition holds:
(2xi − 1) · fi(x−i) ≥ 0.
Next, we study the Nash equilibrium of the Membership
Selection Game.
Lemma 3. A membership profile x∗ is an Nash equilibrium of
the Membership Selection Game, if and only if
(2x∗i − 1) · fi(x∗−i) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ K.
Proposition 2. For each subscriber i, if
ηi,i > ηi , 1−
δ · Π¯i(x∗−i)∑
k∈KS/{i}
(
Vi,k(0,x∗−i)− Vi,k(1,x∗−i)
) ,
then his best response is to choose to be a Bill (i.e., xi = 1).
Intuitively, a subscriber with a large probability of stay-
ing at home will choose to be a Bill, as his network usage on
other APs is small, hence the benefit of obtaining revenue at
his own AP outweighs the payment at other APs.
Unfortunately, the Membership Selection Game may not
always possess an Nash equilibrium in Definition 4, which
is essentially a pure strategy equilibrium (i.e., each subscriber
chooses a particular membership). To illustrate this, we
provide a simple example with 3 APs in the appendix.
Hence, in what follows, we will further look at the case of
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium [23], where each subscriber
may choose both membership types with probabilities.
3.2.4 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
For each subscriber i, his mixed strategy can be characterized
as the probability αi ∈ [0, 1] of choosing to be a Bill (hence
the probability of choosing to be a Linus is 1−αi). The pure
strategy xi is a special case of the mixed strategy when αi
equals 1 or 0. For writing convenience, we denote the mixed
strategy profile of all subscribers except i as
α−i = {αj , j 6= i, j ∈ KS}.
Then, the expected payoff of subscriber i can be defined as
ωi(αi,α−i) = αi · V¯i(1,α−i) + (1− αi) · V¯i(0,α−i), (15)
where V¯i(1,α−i) and V¯i(0,α−i) are subscriber i’s expected
payoffs when choosing to be a Bill and a Linus, respectively.
Note that V¯i(1,α−i) and V¯i(0,α−i) are the expected values
over all possible membership selections of all other users.
Specifically, there are K − 1 other subscribers, hence 2K−1
possible membership selection combination of those sub-
scribers, forming a setX−i. Each subscriber j chooses xj = 1
and 0 with probabilities αj and 1 − αj , respectively. Then,
the probability that a particular x−i ∈ X−i is
ψ(x−i) =
∏
j∈KS\{i}
(
αj · xj + (1− αj) · (1− xj)
)
. (16)
Then, V¯i(1,α−i) and V¯i(0,α−i) can be calculated by
V¯i(xi,α−i) =
∑
x−i∈X−i
ψ(x−i)Vi(xi,x−i), xi ∈ {0, 1}, (17)
where Vi(xi,x−i) is the overall payoff of subscriber i under
the pure strategy profile defined in (13).
Definition 5 (Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium). A mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium of the Membership Selection Game is a
probability profile α∗ such that for each subscriber i ∈ KS:
ωi(α
∗
i ,α
∗
−i) ≥ ωi(αi,α∗−i), ∀αi ∈ [0, 1].
We first show the existence of the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the Membership Selection Game.
Theorem 2. There exists at least one mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the Membership Selection Game.
To compute the Nash equilibrium effectively, we design
a smoothed best response updated algorithm, where each
player updates his mixed strategy in a smoothed best re-
sponse manner according to the other players’ mixed strate-
gies in the previous iteration. The basic idea is as follows.
First, given the mixed strategy profile αn at the n-th round,
each player computes the corresponding expected payoff
when choosing to be Bill (i.e., V˜i(1,αn−i)) or to be Linus (i.e.,
8Algorithm 1 Smoothed Best Response Update Algorithm
Input: α0, γ, ε.
Output: α∗.
1: Set n = 0 and Flag = 0.
2: while Flag = 0 do
3: for i = 1 : K do
4: Calculate V˜i(1,αn−i) and V˜i(0,α
n
−i).
5: Update αn+1i =
e
V˜i(1,α
n−i)/γ
e
V˜i(1,α
n−i)/γ+eV˜i(0,α
n−i)/γ
.
6: end for
7: if |αn+1 −αn| ≤ ε then
8: Set Flag = 1.
9: end if
10: Set n = n+ 1.
11: end while
12: Set α∗ = αn.
V˜i(0,α
n
−i)). Then, each player updates his mixed strategy at
the (n + 1)-th round according to the following smoothed
best response method [24]:
αn+1i =
eV˜i(1,α
n
−i)/γ
eV˜i(1,α
n
−i)/γ + eV˜i(0,α
n
−i)/γ
,
where γ is a parameter that determines the degree to which
the function deviates from the true best response (a larger
γ implies that the player is more likely to act randomly).
Using the result in [24], we can show that such a smoothed
best response with some learning rules (as in fictitious play)
converges to the mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
4 LAYER I: OPERATOR PRICING DESIGN
In this section, we study the operator’s pricing design (for
small-scale networks) in Layer I. The operator designs the
pricing scheme based on his anticipation of users’ member-
ship selections and network access decisions in Layer II.
Note that the operator can choose different pricing
schemes. Two typical examples are the complete price dif-
ferentiation scheme, where the operator charges different
prices on different APs, and the single-pricing scheme,
where the operator charges the same price on all APs. The
former scheme can achieve a high performance (operator
revenue) with the cost of a high computational complexity,
while the latter scheme reduces the complexity with the cost
of revenue loss. To balance the complexity and performance,
we will propose a partial price differentiation scheme, which
generalizes both the complete price differentiation scheme
and the single-pricing scheme.
4.1 Complete Price Differentiation
We first study the complete price differentiation scenario,
where the operator charges different prices on different APs.
The operator optimizes his pricing scheme to maximize
his total expected revenue in one time period, which is
proportional to the network usage of Bills and Aliens. For
convenience, we denote the network usage of Bills and
Aliens as the charged network usage, which brings revenue
for the operator directly.
Charged network usage: We first derive the charged
network usage on a particular AP i ∈ KS in a particular time
slot, which depends on the set of users that are traveling
to AP i. Suppose that a set K(i) of users (except i) are
traveling to AP i in that time slot. That is, the player set in
the corresponding network access game is K(i). The Nash
equilibrium of the game is given in (10), from which we can
further compute the charged network usage on AP i. Hence,
given the user set K(i), the charged network usage on AP i
in one time slot is:∑
j∈K(i)∩KA
σ∗j,i(K(i)) +
∑
j∈K(i)∩KS
xj · σ∗j,i(K(i)),
where σ∗j,i is user j’s equilibrium network usage on AP i,
which is given in Lemmas 1 and 2. The first term denotes
the total network usage from Aliens in K(i), and the second
term denotes the total network usage from Bills in K(i).
Next we derive the charged network usage on AP i in
the whole period of T time slots, which is the expected
value over all possible membership selection combinations
of the other K − 1 subscribers (except i).2 For notational
convenience, we use x−i = {xj : j 6= i, j ∈ KS} to rep-
resent a membership selection combination of other K − 1
subscribers, and use X−i to represent the set of all 2K−1
possible membership selection combinations. Then, the ex-
pected charged network usage on AP i in the whole time
period, denoted as σ¯∗i (p), can be calculated by Eq. (18) on
the top of next page, where K−i is the power set of KU \{i}.
The term φ(K(i)) denotes the probability that a set K(i) of
users are travelling to AP i in a time slot, and is calculated
by Eq. (11). The term ψ(x−i) denotes the probability that
a particular membership selection combination x−i ∈ X−i
occurs, and is calculated by Eq. (16).
Operator’s expected revenue: The total expected rev-
enue generated on AP i is proportional to the charged
network usage, i.e., pi · σ¯∗i (p), where pi is the price per unit
connection time charged to Bills and Aliens on AP i. We use
α∗i to represent subscriber i’s probability of choosing to be a
Bill at equilibrium. Recall that if subscriber i chooses to be
a Linus (with probability 1 − α∗i ), the operator can obtain
all the revenue generated on AP i. If subscriber i chooses to
be a Bill (with probability α∗i ), the operator can only obtain
1−δ of the revenue generated on AP i. Hence, the operator’s
expected revenue collected on AP i is:
hi(p) =
[
1 · (1− α∗i ) + (1− δ) · α∗i
] · pi · σ¯∗i (p). (19)
Thus, the operator’s total expected revenue collected on all
APs in the whole time period is
HC(p) =
K∑
i=1
hi(p).
Based on the above analysis, the operator’s complete
price differentiation problem can be defined as follows:
Problem 1: Complete Price Differentiation
max HC(p) =
K∑
i=1
hi(p)
var: pi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ KS
2. User i’s own membership selection does not affect the charged
network usage on AP i, as each AP owner uses his private channel
exclusively and does not account for the charged network usage.
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∑
x−i∈X−i
ψ(x−i)
 ∑
K(i)∈K−i
φ(K(i))
 ∑
j∈K(i)∩KA
σ∗j,i(K(i)) +
∑
j∈K(i)∩KS
xjσ
∗
j,i(K(i))
 . (18)
We can easily compute an effective upper bound for each
price variable pi in the above Problem 1:
pi ≤ p¯ , max
i∈KU
ρi · R¯(1), (20)
where ρi is the network access evaluation of user i (charac-
terizing user i’s valuation of data consumption), and R¯(1) is
the average data rate that a user can achieve when accessing
a Wi-Fi AP exclusively, and can be calculated by Eq. (3). By
Lemma 2, we can easily find that any price pi larger than p¯
will lead to a zero network usage for all Bills and Aliens on
AP i, hence a zero revenue for the operator. Thus, we can
focus on finding the optimal prices within their respective
upper bounds, without affecting the optimality. Moreover,
such upper bounds are also very useful for implementing
the iterative algorithm to solve Problem 1 numerically,
which will be discussed soon later.
Unfortunately, it is very challenging to solve Problem 1,
as it is a mixed multi-level problem, where continuous and
binary variables are coupled with each other in a highly
nonlinear manner. Nevertheless, we can explore some useful
characteristics of Problem 1, which will help us find the
solution numerically.
First, the derivative of the objective function is not read-
ily computable, since we do not have the explicit function
relationship of the membership profiles with respect to the
prices. Second, given any price vector p, we can compute
the objective value, since the optimal total charged network
usage on each AP σ¯∗i (p) is given by Eq. (18), and the
equilibrium α∗(p) of Membership Selection Game can be
computed by the smoothed best response update algorithm.
The unavailability of the derivative information of the ob-
jective function makes the use of gradient-based methods
impossible, and availability of the objective value makes
the use of derivative-free algorithms possible. These factors
motivates us to use the derivative-free algorithm [25].
We propose to use a recently developed DYCORS (DY-
namically COordinate search using Response Surface mod-
els) algorithm [26], which is one of the derivative-free
algorithms, to solve Problem 1. A DYCORS algorithm is
often designed to solve the box-constrained optimization
problem. The key idea of DYCORS is to build and maintain
a surrogate model [27] of the objective function at each
iteration, and generate trial solutions by using a dynamic
coordinate search strategy. It selects the iterate from a set of
random trail solutions obtained by perturbing only a subset
of the coordinates of the current best solution, which is
helpful in finding the global minimum. Moreover, the prob-
ability of perturbing a coordinate decreases as the algorithm
reaches the computational budget. If the objective function
of Problem 1 is continuous, then the DYCORS algorithm
converges to a global optimal solution with probability one.
4.2 Partial Price Differentiation
The complete price differentiation is of high implementation
complexity and user aversion. However, if the operator
implements the single pricing scheme and ignores the differ-
ence among different APs, it may suffer from a high revenue
loss. To this end, we propose a partial price differentiation
scheme, where the operator charges the same price on
APs with similar attributes, to achieve a tradeoff between
the revenue and implementation complexity. Note that the
complete price differentiation scheme and the single pricing
scheme are special cases of the partial price differentiation
scheme.
In the partial price differentiation scheme, the operator
charges the same price on the APs in the same group
(i.e., those with similar attributes), while different prices on
different groups. This is analogous to the third-degree price
discrimination in economics [28], [29], where prices are set
according to user segmentation (based on user attributes
such as ages, occupations, and genders).
In our partial price differentiation, all APs are first seg-
mented into different groups, based on the AP attributes
(such as location hotness, i.e., the summation of other users’
probabilities of roaming to that location, also called location
popularity) and the AP owners’ network access evaluation.
Then, a single price is set for all APs in the same group.
4.2.1 AP Segmentation
We assume that the operator segments the set KS =
{1, 2, · · · ,K} of APs into G (G ≤ K) groups. We denote
the set of APs in group g (g = 1, 2, · · · , G) as set Sg , and
we denote the AP segmentation result, i.e., the set of all G
AP sets, as S = {S1,S2, · · · ,SG}. The AP segmentation is
based on AP attributes. The APs in the same set Sg have
similar attributes.
The AP segmentation problem has several characteris-
tics. First, the number of APs involved in the AP segmenta-
tion problem can be very large, e.g., several hundred or sev-
eral thousand. Second, the AP segmentation is based on AP
attributes, such as location hotness and AP owner’s network
access evaluation. So each AP is described by a multiple
dimensional data profile in the AP segmentation problem.
Third, different AP attributes can be of different importance
in the segmentation problem. The above three characteristics
motivate us to use the weighted k-means clustering [30], [31]
to deal with the AP segmentation problem.
The k-means clustering is popular for many real world
applications such as user segmentation in marketing re-
search [30]. The weighted k-means clustering [31] assigns
a weight to each attribute, where the weight measures the
importance of the weight in the clustering. Details of the
weighted k-means clustering can be found in the appendix.
By applying the weighted k-means clustering, we can
obtain the AP segmentation result S = {S1,S2, · · · ,SG}.
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In Section 6, we provide numerical results to illustrate
how the AP attributes and corresponding weights affect the
AP segmentation result.
4.2.2 Price Optimization
In the partial price differentiation scheme, the operator sets
one price to APs in the same group.
Given the AP segmentation S = {S1,S2, · · · ,SG}, the
operator’s partial price differentiation problem is as follows:
Problem 2: Partial Price Differentiation
max HP (pP ) =
K∑
i=1
hi(p
P )
var: pPg ≥ 0,∀g = 1, 2, · · · , G
Here, pP = {pP1 , pP2 , · · · , pPG}. The objective function
HP (pP ) is similar as HC(p), by replacing pi in HC(p) with
pPg if i ∈ Sg . Obviously, Problem 2 has the similar structure
as Problem 1, hence we can use the DYCORS algorithm to
solve it.
5 APPROXIMATE MODEL AND ANALYSIS FOR
LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS
It is important to note that the complexity of the Stackelberg
model (in Sections 3 and 4) increases exponentially with the
number of APs. Hence, in large-scale networks with a large
number of APs, users may not be able to make the fully
rational decisions due to the limited computation abilities.
In this section, we will propose and analyze an approximate
Stackelberg model for such a large-scale system.
The basic framework of the approximate Stackelberg
model is similar as that of the Stackelberg model in Figure
2. Namely, the operator optimizes the pricing scheme in
Layer I, and users decide their probabilities of choosing
to be Bills/Linues and their network access in Layer II.
The key difference is summarized as follows. In a large-
scale network, each user may not be able to enumerate
all possible behaviors of other users and then calculate
his payoff by Eqs. (15)-(17) accordingly, due to the limited
computation capability of each user. Hence, in the approxi-
mate Stackelberg model, each user will behave based on the
estimated expected behaviors of other users. In the previous
Stackelber model, however, each user will behave based on
the complete enumeration of all possible behaviors of all
other users.
Next, we will analyze the approximate Stackelberg
model by backward induction.
5.1 Layer II: User Behavior Analysis
Users’ approximate two-stage dynamic game is the same
as the one illustrated in Figure 3. Subscribers participate in
an approximate membership selection game in Stage I and
decide their probabilities of choosing to be Bills/Linus at
the beginning of one time period. Users participate in an
approximate network access game in Stage II and decide
their network access time on the APs in each time slot.
We analyze the approximate two-stage dynamic game by
backward induction.
5.1.1 Stage II: Approximate Network Access Game on
Each AP
The approximate network access game in the approximate
Stackelberg model is different from the network access game
in the Stackelberg model. In the large-scale system, when a
user travels to an AP location, he can neither derive the set
of other users who travel to the same AP location, nor those
users’ precise network access decisions. Hence, we assume
that each user only knows other users’ expected network
access decisions.
We define the approximate network access game on AP
k in the large-scale system as follows.
Game (Approximate Network Access Game on AP k).
• Players: the set KU = KS ∪ KA of users in the network;
• Strategies: σ˜i,k ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ KU;
• Payoffs: v˜i,k(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k), ∀i ∈ KU.
The payoff is the difference between the utility and the
payment (charged to Bills and Aliens).
The utility of user i ∈ KU on AP k is
u˜i(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k) = ρi log(1 + r˜k(σ˜k) · σ˜i,k). (21)
Here r˜k(σ˜k) is the data rate that user i can achieve on AP k.
When the number of user in the network is large, we assume
that each user will achieve the same data rate r˜k(σ˜k) on AP
k, which is a function of all users’ network access decisions
σ˜k = {σ˜i,k,∀i ∈ KU}:
r˜k(σ˜k) = R¯(
∑
i 6=k
ηi,kσ˜i,k). (22)
Here
∑
i6=k ηi,kσ˜i,k represents the expected number of users
who access AP k simultaneously in a single time slot, and
R¯(
∑
i6=k ηi,kσ˜i,k) is given by Eq. (3) and denotes the average
data rate of a user when
∑
i 6=k ηi,kσ˜i,k users are connecting
to AP k simultaneously.
If user i is a Linus, his payoff is just his utility, since he
does not need to pay for his network usage on AP k:
v˜Li,k(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k) = u˜i(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k). (23)
If user i is a Bill or Alien, his payoff is the difference between
his utility and payment:
v˜Bi,k(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k) = u˜i(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k)− p˜kσ˜i,k. (24)
Here p˜k is the unit price charged to Bills and Aliens on AP
k in the approximate Stackelberg model.
We summarize the payoff of user i ∈ KU in the Approx-
imate Network Access Game (on AP k) as follows:
v˜i,k(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k) =
v˜Li,k(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k), if i ∈ KS and xi = 0;
v˜Bi,k(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k), if i ∈ KS and xi = 1;
v˜Bi,k(σ˜i,k, σ˜−i,k), if i ∈ KA.
(25)
We derive the best response of user i ∈ KU as follows.
Lemma 4. If user i is a Linus, his best response in the Approxi-
mate Network Access Game on AP k in the large-scale system is
σ˜L∗i,k = 1, (26)
regardless of other users’ strategies.
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Lemma 5. If user i is a Bill or an Alien, his best response in the
Approximate Network Access Game on AP k in the large-scale
system is
σ˜B∗i,k = min
{
1,max
{
ρi
p˜k
− 1
r˜k(σ˜k)
, 0
}}
, (27)
which is a function of users’ strategy profile σ˜k.
Regarding the existence of the Nash equilibrium, we
have the same conclusion as that in the network access game
of the Stackelberg model, i.e., Theorem 1 in Section 3.1. We
can use the same best response update algorithm in Section
3.1 to derive the Nash equilibrium for the approximate
network access game.
5.1.2 Stage I: Approximate Membership Selection Game
Now we study the approximate membership selection game
in the large-scale system.
The players are the setKS of subscribers. Each subscriber
decides his probability of choosing to be a Bill. Because
of the limited computation capability, users are bounded
rational. Each user aims to maximize his perceived payoff
which is based on the expected behaviors of other users.
We define the approximate membership selection game
in the large-scale system as follows.
Game (Approximate Membership Selection Game).
• Players: the set KS of subscribers.
• Strategies: α˜i ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ KS.
• Payoffs: ω˜i(α˜i, α˜−i), ∀i ∈ KS.
The perceived expected payoff of subscriber i choosing
to be a Bill with probability α˜i is:
ω˜i(α˜i, α˜−i) = (1− α˜i)V˜ Li (0, α˜−i) + α˜iV˜ Bi (1, α˜−i), (28)
where V˜ Li (0, α˜−i) is the perceived payoff when subscriber
i chooses to be a Linus, and V˜ Bi (1, α˜−i) is the perceived
payoff when subscriber i chooses to be a Bill. Due to the
limited computation capability of subscriber i, subscriber
i can not calculate V˜ Li (0, α˜−i) and V˜
B
i (1, α˜−i) based on
the enumeration of all possible membership selections of
other users, as in Eq. (17). The calculation of V˜ Li (0, α˜−i)
and V˜ Bi (1, α˜−i) is based on the expected behaviors of other
users perceived by subscriber i.
Specifically, if subscriber i chooses to be a Linus, his
perceived payoff V˜ Li (0, α˜−i) includes his perceived utility
on all possible APs that he may travel to during the whole
time period.
When Linus i stays at home and access his own AP, his
perceived payoff is:
V˜ Li,i(0, α˜−i) = ρi log(1 + r¯i,i · 1).
Recall that r¯i,i corresponds to the average data rate that
Linus i achieves at his private channel. When Linus i travels
to AP k, his perceived payoff of connecting to AP k is:
V˜ Li,k(0, α˜−i) = ρi log(1 + r˜k(σ˜k) · 1).
When Linus i travels to an area that is not covered by any
of the K Wi-Fi APs, his perceived payoff is:
V˜ Li,0(0, α˜−i) = 0.
Based on the above, the perceived payoff of Linus i is
V˜ Li (0, α˜−i) = T
K∑
k=0
ηi,kV˜
L
i,k(0, α˜−i). (29)
If subscriber i chooses to be a Bill, his perceived payoff
V˜ Bi (1, α˜−i) includes his payoff on all possible APs that
he may travel to during the whole time period and the
expected revenue that subscriber i collects on his own AP.
Similarly, when Bill i stays at home and access his own
AP, his perceived payoff is:
V˜ Bi,i(1, α˜−i) = ρi log(1 + r¯i,i · 1).
When Bill i travels to AP k, his perceived payoff of connect-
ing to AP k is:
V˜ Bi,k(1, α˜−i) = ρi log(1 + r˜k(σ˜k)σ˜
B∗
i,k )− p˜kσ˜B∗i,k ,
where σ˜B∗i,k is calculated by Eq. (27). When Bill i travels to
an area that is not covered by any of the K Wi-Fi APs, his
perceived payoff is:
V˜ Bi,0(1, α˜−i) = 0.
The expected revenue that Bill i collects on his own AP
is a δ portion of the payment of all Aliens and Bills, which
can be calculated as:
Π˜Bi (1, α˜−i)
=Tδp˜i
 ∑
j∈KU
⋂KA
ηj,iσ˜
B∗
j,i +
∑
j∈KU
⋂KS,j 6=i
ηj,iα˜j σ˜
B∗
j,i
 .
Based on the above, the perceived payoff of Bill i is
V˜ Bi (1, α˜−i) = Π˜
B
i (1, α˜−i) + T
K∑
k=0
ηi,kV˜
B
i,k(0, α˜−i). (30)
Regarding the existence of the Nash equilibrium, we
have the same conclusions in Theorem 2 as the membership
selection game in the Stackelberg model, in Section 3.2. We
can use the same smoothed best response update algorithm
in Section 3.2 to derive the Nash equilibrium for the approx-
imate membership selection game.
5.2 Layer I: Operator Pricing Design
In this section, we study the operator’s pricing design in
Layer I of the approximate Stackelberg model. Similarly, we
propose a partial price differentiation scheme.
In the partial price differentiation scheme, the operator
first segment the APs in the network into different groups,
based on AP attributes, as in Section 4.2.1. We denote the set
of APs in group g (g = 1, 2, · · · , G) as set S˜g , and we denote
the AP segmentation result as S˜ = {S˜1, S˜2, · · · , S˜G}.
Then the operator sets one price to APs in the same
group. The operator’s goal is to maximize the total revenue
he collected on all APs in the network:
H˜(p˜P ) =
K∑
i=1
h˜i(p˜
P ).
Here h˜i(p˜P ) is the expected revenue collected by the opera-
tor on AP i, which can be written as:
h˜i(p˜
P ) = (1 · (1− α˜∗i ) + (1− δ) α˜∗i ) p˜Pg σ˜∗i (p˜P ), (31)
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Here i ∈ S˜g , and σ˜∗i (p˜P ) is the expected charged network
usage from all Bills (except subscriber i) and Aliens at
equilibrium on AP i:
σ˜∗i (p˜
P ) = T p˜Pg
 ∑
j∈KU
⋂KA
ηj,iσ˜
B∗
j,i +
∑
j∈KU
⋂KS,j 6=i
ηj,iα˜j σ˜
B∗
j,i
 .
Given the AP segmentation S˜ = {S˜1, S˜2, · · · , S˜G}, the
operator’s partial price differentiation problem in the ap-
proximate Stackelberg model can be written as follows:
Problem 3: Approximate Partial Price Differentiation
max H˜(p˜P ) =
K∑
i=1
h˜i(p˜
P )
var: p˜Pg ≥ 0,∀g = 1, 2, · · · , G
Problem 3 has similar structure as Problem 2. Hence, we
propose to use DYCORS algorithm to solve Problem 3.
6 SIMULATION RESULTS
We provide simulation results to illustrate the users’ behav-
iors in Section 6.1 and evaluate the operator’s revenue in
Section 6.2.
6.1 User Behaviors
Regarding user behaviors, we numerically study how the
network access valuation parameter ρi and the mobility pat-
tern ηi affect subscriber i’s membership selection decision,
given other system parameters fixed. In what follows, we
will first simulate a small network with 2 APs (subscribers)
and 1 Alien, to gain insights of a single user’s best choice.
Then, we will simulate a large network with 500 APs and
500 Aliens to understand the system-level performance.
6.1.1 A Small Network Example
We simulate a small network with 2 subscribers (each owns
an AP) and 1 Alien. We study how subscriber 1’s network
access valuation parameter ρ1 and his probability of staying
at home η1,1 affect his membership selection.
We assume that the revenue sharing ratio δ = 0.5.
Both APs have the same price p = 1. In Section 6.2, we
will consider the operator’s price optimization problem.
The mobility patterns of subscriber 2 and the Alien are
the same: η2 = ηa = [1/3, 1/3, 1/3]. We assume that
ρ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Subscriber 1 stays at home with probability η1,1,
and travels to AP 2 and outside the Wi-Fi coverage with a
same probability η1,2 = η1,0 = (1− η1,1)/2.
Figure 5 shows subscriber 1’s membership selection
decision in the equilibrium (Definition 5 in Section 3.2.4),
under different values of ρi ∈ [0, 1] and η1,1 ∈ [0, 1].
The color represents the value of α1, which is subscriber
1’s probability of choosing to be a Bill. The black region
corresponds to α1 = 1, and the white region corresponds
to α1 = 0. The color in between corresponds to a mixed
strategy of α1 ∈ (0, 1), as shown in the colorbar on the
right.
Figure 5 shows that when η1,1 is large enough (i.e.,
larger than 0.82), i.e., subscriber 1 stays at home most of
the time, his will always choose to be a Bill (with the prob-
ability α1 = 1), independent of subscriber 2’s membership
decision. As η1,1 becomes smaller and ρ1 becomes larger,
the performance and payment during roaming becomes
increasingly important, so subscriber 1 starts to choose a
mixed strategy with a smaller number of α1. When η1,1 is
small enough and ρ1 is large enough, e.g., the right bottom
corner of Figure 5, he will always choose to be a Linus with
a probability 1− α1 = 1.
6.1.2 Simulation Results for Large Network
Next, we simulate a larger network with 500 APs and 500
Aliens. We assume the price p = 1 and the revenue sharing
ratio δ = 0.5 . We study how the system parameters, i.e.,
the location popularity and the network access evaluation,
affect subscribers’ membership decisions.
We first study how the location popularity of an AP
affects the subscriber’s membership selection decision. We
assume that each subscriber’s network access valuation
parameter ρi = 1,∀i ∈ KS. Since Aliens do not have APs,
we assume that Aliens value the network access more, and
ρi = 5,∀i ∈ KA. We assume that all users show up at a
particular AP, e.g., AP i (i ∈ KS), with the same probability
η¯i, i.e.,
ηj,i = η¯i,∀j ∈ KU.
We denote η¯0 as the probability of users showing up at areas
that are not covered by any WiFi AP. Obviously, we have:
K∑
i=0
η¯i = 1.
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For simplicity, we assume that the location popularity η¯i
increases with the AP index i.
Figure 6 shows each of the 500 subscribers’ membership
selection decision. Simulation result shows that the sub-
scriber’s probability of choosing to be a Bill increases with
his AP location popularity. The reason is that a subscriber
whose AP is located at a more popular location can earn
more revenue from other Bills and Aliens.
We then study how the network access evaluation of
a subscriber affects his membership selection decision. We
assume that the probability of each user showing up at
each location is uniform and same. We assume that the sub-
scribers’ network access evaluation parameters ρi increases
with the AP index i.
Figure 7 shows each of the 500 subscribers’ member-
ship selection decision. Simulation result shows that the
subscriber’s probability of choosing to be a Bill decreases
with his network access evaluation. This is because he cares
more about the network access benefit when roaming, and
hence is more willing to be a Linus to enjoy free access and
consume more data during roaming.
6.2 The Operator’s Revenue
Regarding the operator’s revenue, we numerically study the
performance of the partial price differentiation scheme in a
large network. We consider a network which consists of 100
APs and 100 Aliens.
We assume that subscribers’ network access evaluation
parameters ρi,∀i ∈ KS follow the Gaussian distribution
with a mean value of 4 and a variance of 2. We obtain the
APs’ location popularity η¯i =
∑
j 6=i ηj,i (∀i ∈ KS) based
on the the realistic mobility data in [32]. Figure 8 shows the
relationship between network access evaluation parameter
and location popularity parameter.
We study the performance of the partial price differenti-
ation scheme. We first use the weighted k-means clustering
algorithm to segment APs into different groups considering
the attributes of network access evaluation and location
popularity. We assign a weight β to the attribute of network
access evaluation and 1 − β to the attribute of location
popularity in the weighted k-means clustering algorithm.
The AP segmentation results under different weight β are
provided in the appendix, Then we apply the price differ-
entiation scheme and optimize over the prices to maximize
the operator’s revenue.
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Figure 9. Operator’s Revenue under the Patial Price Differentiation
Figure 9 shows the operator’s revenue under different
number of groups and different weight β. Given a partic-
ular weight β, we can see that (i) the operator’s revenue
increases with the number of groups; and (ii) the revenue
increase rate slows down as the number of groups increase.
Given a particular number of groups, the revenue difference
under different β is small. Compared with the single pricing
scheme, the two-price scheme can effectively increase the
operator’s revenue by up to 124.44%. However, the revenue
increase from the 6-price scheme to the 7-price scheme
is only 0.78%. Hence, the operator can achieve a good
tradeoff of total revenue and implementation complexity,
by applying the partial price differentiation scheme.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze the user behavior and the operator
pricing design for the crowdsourced wireless community
network. We model the interactions between the operator
and users as a Stackelberg model where users are fully
rational in small-scale systems. For the large-scale systems
where users are bounded rational due to the limited com-
putation capability, we propose and analyze an approximate
Stackelberg model. We study the user behaviors under both
full rationality and bounded rationality systematically. We
show that a user with a more popular home location, a
smaller probability of travelling, or a smaller network access
evaluation is more likely to choose to be a Bill. Moreover,
we propose a partial price differentiation scheme for the
operator, based on the analysis of users response to the
pricing scheme. Our numerical results show that the pro-
posed partial price differentiation scheme with only two
prices can increase the operator’s revenue up to 124.44%
comparing with the single pricing scheme, and can achieve
an average of 80% of the maximum operator revenue under
the complete price differentiation scheme.
There are several interesting and important extensions
for the model in this work. For example, it is important to
study the model under information asymmetry, where users
have some private information, e.g., network access valua-
tion ρ and user mobility pattern η. In that case, the operator
needs to further design an incentive compatible mechanism
(e.g., auction) to elicit the users’ private information.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. If user i is a Linus, his payoff on AP k can be derived
from Eq. (3), which is an increasing function of σi,k. Hence,
regardless of other users’ strategies, a Linus-type user i’s
best response is always to choose the maximum network
access time, i.e., σ∗i,k = 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. If user i is a Bill or an Alien, his payoff at AP k can
be derived from Eq. (4). Hence, the payoff maximization
problem for user i on AP k can be written as follows
max ρi log(1 + r¯i,k(σ−i,k) · σi,k)− pσi,k
s.t. 0 ≤ σi,k ≤ 1
var: σi,k
which is a concave maximization problem. By using the
first-order optimality condition, we can derive a Bill-type
or Alien user i’s best response:
σ∗i,k = min
{
1,max
{
ρi
p
− 1
r¯i,k(σ−i,k)
, 0
}}
,
which is a function of other users’ strategies σ−i,k.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. To prove Theorem 1, we first introduce the Brouwer
fixed-point theorem [17], which states that every continuous
mapping f from a compact convex set to itself has a fixed
point z0 satisfying z0 = f(z0).
The Nash equilibrium σ∗k = {σ∗i,k,∀i ∈ K(k)} is com-
puted by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Specifically,
σi,k =
{
1, Linus i;
min
{
1,max
{
ρi
p − 1r¯i,k(σ−i,k) , 0
}}
, Bill or Alien i.
This is a continuous mapping from a compact convex set
[0, 1] to itself, which satisfies the requirement of the Brouwer
fixed-point theorem. Hence, there exists a fixed point σ∗k
satisfying
σ∗i,k =
1, Linus i;min{1,max{ρip − 1r¯i,k(σ∗−i,k) , 0}} , Bill or Alien i.
The fixed point σ∗k is the Nash equilibrium.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Assume there are 2 APs and 1 Alien in the network, and we
study the two-player network access game on AP 2. The two
players are subscriber 1 and the Alien, and their strategies
are σ1,2 ∈ [0, 1] and σa,2 ∈ [0, 1]. We have already shown
that there exists a Nash equilibrium (σ∗1,2, σ
∗
a,2) where:
σ∗1,2 =
{
1, if x1 = 0;
min
{
1,max
{
ρ1
p − 1r¯1,2(σ∗a,2) , 0
}}
, if x1 = 1;
and
σ∗a,2 = min{1,max{
ρa
p
− 1
r¯a,2(σ∗1,2)
, 0}}.
Here the expected data rates of subscriber 1 and the Alien
are
r¯1,2(σ
∗
a,2) = (1− σ∗a,2)R¯(1) + σ∗a,2R¯(2),
r¯a,2(σ
∗
1,2) = (1− σ∗1,2)R¯(1) + σ∗1,2R¯(2).
Now we show Proposition 1 is true.
Proof. If subscriber 1 chooses to be a Linus, i.e., x1 = 0, then
σ∗1,2 = 1, and
σ∗a,2 = min{1,max{
ρa
p
− 1
R¯(2)
, 0}}.
The Nash equilibrium is unique and we can directly derive
it.
If subscriber 1 chooses to be a Bill, i.e., x1 = 1, then we
consider the following cases:
A: If ρ1p − 1R¯(1) < 0, then σ∗1,2 = 0 and
σ∗a,2 =
ρa
p
− 1
R¯(1)
.
B: If ρ1p − 1R¯(2) > 1, then σ∗1,2 = 1 and
σ∗a,2 =
ρa
p
− 1
R¯(2)
.
C: If ρ1p − 1R¯(1) ≥ 0 and ρ1p − 1R¯(2) ≤ 1, then we further
consider the following three subcases:
• If ρap − 1R¯(1) < 0, then σ∗a,2 = 0 and
σ∗1,2 =
ρ1
p
− 1
R¯(1)
.
• If ρap − 1R¯(2) > 1, then σ∗a,2 = 1 and
σ∗1,2 =
ρ1
p
− 1
R¯(2)
.
• If ρap − 1R¯(1) ≥ 0 and ρap − 1R¯(2) ≤ 1, then we have
σ∗1,2 =
ρ1
p
− 1
r¯1,2(σ∗a,2)
,
σ∗a,2 =
ρa
p
− 1
r¯a,2(σ∗1,2)
,
which can be denoted as the following mapping
σ∗2 = T (σ
∗
2).
We have:∣∣∣∣∣
(
ρ1
p
− 1
r¯1,2(σ∗a,2)
)
−
(
ρ1
p
− 1
r¯1,2(σ
†
a,2)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1r¯1,2(σ†a,2) −
1
r¯1,2(σ∗a,2)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1R(1)− σ†a,2(R(1)−R(2)) −
1
R(1)− σ∗a,2(R(1)−R(2))
∣∣∣∣∣
=
[R(1)−R(2)] · |σ∗a,2 − σ†a,2|
[R(1)− σ∗a,2(R(1)−R(2))][R(1)− σ†a,2(R(1)−R(2))]
≤c · |σ∗a,2 − σ†a,2|,
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and similarly∣∣∣∣∣
(
ρa
p
− 1
r¯a,2(σ∗1,2)
)
−
(
ρa
p
− 1
r¯a,2(σ
†
1,2)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ c|σ∗1,2−σ†1,2|.
The above shows that
‖T (σ∗2)− T (σ†2)‖ ≤ c‖σ∗2 − σ†2‖.
The condition in Proposition 1, i.e., c < 1, implies that the
mapping function T (·) is contractive.
The contract mapping implies that the Nash equilibrium
(σ∗1,2, σ
∗
a,2) is unique.
APPENDIX E
CASES WITH MORE THAN TWO PLAYERS
For the cases with more than two players, the uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium depends on the system parameter
in a more complicated fashion. For example, for the case
with three players, the Nash equilibrium is unique as long
as 2 max{R¯1 − R¯2, R¯2 − R¯3}/min{R¯1, R¯2, 2R¯2 − R¯1, R¯1 +
R¯3−2R¯2} < 1. The proof idea is similar as the the proof for
the case with two players.
APPENDIX F
A BEST RESPONSE UPDATE ALGORITHM FOR THE
NETWORK ACCESS GAME
We further design a Best Response Update Algorithm to
derive the Nash equilibrium. The basic idea is as follows.
Given the strategy profile σnk at the n-th round, each player
computes the corresponding best response. We denote the
best responses of all players by T (σnk ). Each user updates
the strategy at the (n + 1)-th round as the best response in
T (σnk ).
Algorithm 2 Best Response Update Algorithm
Input: σ0k, ε.
Output: σ∗k.
1: Set n = 0 and Flag = 0.
2: while Flag = 0 do
3: Calculate σn+1k = T (σ
n
k ).
4: if |σn+1k − σnk | ≤ ε then
5: Set Flag = 1.
6: end if
7: Set n = n+ 1.
8: end while
9: Set σ∗k = σ
n
k .
As shown in Appendix D, the mapping T (·) under
the condition c < 1 is contractive in the Network Access
Game with two players. This immediately implies that the
sequence generated by the Best Response Update Algorithm
converges to the unique Nash equilibrium and the conver-
gence rate is linear.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. We first prove the necessity. If fi(x∗−i) < 0, the
best membership for subscriber i is x∗i = 0 (Linus), hence
(2x∗i − 1) · fi(x∗−i) = −fi(x∗−i) > 0. If fi(x∗−i) > 0, the
best membership for subscriber i is x∗i = 1 (Bill), hence
(2x∗i − 1) · fi(x∗−i) = fi(x∗−i) > 0. Then we prove the
sufficiency. Suppose fi(x∗−i) < 0. Then the desired x
∗
i that
satisfies the condition in Lemma 3 is x∗i = 0, which is obvi-
ously the best strategy of subscriber i. Suppose fi(x∗−i) > 0.
Then the desired x∗i that satisfies the condition in Lemma 3
is x∗i = 1, which is also the best strategy of subscriber i.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. By (10), we notice that a subscriber i’s will choose to
be a Bill (i.e., xi = 1) if Vi(1,x∗−i) > Vi(0,x
∗
−i), i.e.,
δ · Π¯i(x∗−i) >
∑
k∈KS
ηi,k ·
(
Vi,k(0,x
∗
−i)− Vi,k(1,x∗−i)
)
=
∑
k∈KS/{i}
ηi,k ·
(
Vi,k(0,x
∗
−i)− Vi,k(1,x∗−i)
)
.
The equality in the second line follows because
Vi,i(0,x
∗
−i) = Vi,i(1,x
∗
−i). This is because a subscriber does
not need to pay for using his own AP, either as a Bill or as
a Linus. Hence, he will achieve the same payoff on his own
AP regardless of his membership selection.
We further notice that if
ηi,i > ηi , 1−
δ · Π¯i(x∗−i)∑
k∈KS/{i}
(
Vi,k(0,x∗−i)− Vi,k(1,x∗−i)
) ,
then, we have:
δ·Π¯i(x∗−i) > (1−ηi,i)·
∑
k∈KS/{i}
(
Vi,k(0,x
∗
−i)− Vi,k(1,x∗−i)
)
.
It is easy to see that the right-hand side of the above
inequality is larger than∑
k∈KS/{i}
ηi,k ·
(
Vi,k(0,x
∗
−i)− Vi,k(1,x∗−i)
)
as 1−ηi,i =
∑
j 6=i ηi,j ≥ ηi,k, ∀k ∈ KS/{i}. This implies that
if the condition ηi,i > ηi holds, then Vi(1,x
∗
−i) > Vi(0,x
∗
−i),
and accordingly, subscriber i’s best strategy is to choose Bill.
APPENDIX I
A SIMPLE EXAMPLE SHOWING INEXISTENCE OF
A PURE STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE
MEMBERSHIP SELECTION GAME
Here we provide a small example with 3 subscribers {1, 2,
3}, where the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist.
Consider the following example:
• Subscriber 1 travels to APs 2 and 3 with the same
probability 0.3 and stays at home with the probability
0.4, i.e., η1 = (0, 0.4, 0.3, 0.3);
• Subscriber 2 only travels to AP 3 (i.e., never travels
to AP 1) with the probability 0.3 and stays at home
with the probability 0.7, i.e., η1 = (0, 0.7, 0, 0.3);
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• Subscriber 3 always stays at home, i.e., η3 =
(0, 1, 0, 0);
Obviously, subscriber 3’s best strategy is always Bill,
regardless of the membership selections of other two sub-
scribers.
Next we observe the best strategies of subscribers 1 and
2. For illustrative purpose, we assume the following payoff
or revenue for subscriber 1:
• The total expected payment on AP 1 (from Aliens)
is 1.0, with a portion δ = 12% is transferred to
subscriber 1 when choosing to be a Bill;
• The expected payoffs on AP 2 are 1.5 when choosing
Linus, and 1.2 when choosing Bill;
• The expected payoffs on AP 3 are 1.0 when choosing
Linus, and 0.8 when choosing Bill, supposing that
subscriber 2 is a Bill;
• The expected payoffs on AP 3 are 0.7 when choosing
Linus, and 0.6 when choosing Bill, supposing that
subscriber 2 is a Linus;
It is easy to see that if subscriber 2 is a Bill, the best choice
of subscriber 1 is Linus, because
1.5× 0.3 + 1.0× 0.3 > 1.2× 0.3 + 0.8× 0.3 + 1.0× 12%,
while if subscriber 2 is a Linus, the best choice of subscriber
1 is Linus, because
1.5× 0.3 + 0.7× 0.3 < 1.2× 0.3 + 0.6× 0.3 + 1.0× 12%.
Furthermore, we assume the following payoff or revenue
for subscriber 2:
• The total expected payment on AP 2 (from subscriber
1 and Aliens) is 1.0 (supposing that subscriber 1 is
a Bill), with a portion δ = 12% is transferred to
subscriber 2 when choosing to be a Bill.
• The total expected payment on AP 2 (from Aliens) is
0.2 (supposing that subscriber 1 is a Linus), with a
portion δ = 12% is transferred to subscriber 2 when
choosing to be a Bill.
• The expected payoffs on AP 3 are 1.0 when choosing
Linus, and 0.8 when choosing Bill, supposing that
subscriber 1 is a Bill;
• The expected payoffs on AP 3 are 0.7 when choosing
Linus, and 0.6 when choosing Bill, supposing that
subscriber 1 is a Linus;
It is easy to see that if subscriber 1 is a Bill, the best choice
of subscriber 2 is Bill, because
1.0× 0.3 < 0.8× 0.3 + 1.0× 12%,
while if subscriber 1 is a Linus, the best choice of subscriber
1 is Linus, because
0.7× 0.3 > 0.6× 0.3 + 0.2× 12%.
Obviously, in the above example, subscriber 1 seeks to
choose the different membership as subscriber 2, while sub-
scriber 2 seeks to choose the same membership as subscriber
1. Hence, it is easy to check that there is no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium.
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. The Membership Selection Game is a finite game,
with K players and each player having two strategies (i.e.,
0 and 1). Hence, there exists at least one mixed strategy
equilibrium (which includes the pure strategy equilibrium
as a special case) [18].
APPENDIX K
DYCORS ALGORITHM FOR THE OPERATOR’S
PRICE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In the DYCORS algorithm, we denote n0 as the number of
space-filling design points, n as the number of previously
evaluated points, An = {p(1), . . . ,p(n)} as the set of previ-
ously evaluated points, and sn(p) as the response surface
model built using the points in An. We denote Nfmax
as the maximum number of function evaluations allowed,
and a strict decreasing function Υ(n) as the probability of
perturbing a coordinate whose values are in [0, 1]. Detailed
discussions regarding the physical meanings of these pa-
rameters can be found in [26].
Algorithm 3 DYCORS Algorithm [26]
Input: K,KA,η,ρ, δ.
Output: p∗,α∗.
1: Evaluate the initial points I = {p(1), . . . ,p(n0)}.
2: Find the best point found so far p∗.
3: Set n = n0,An = I .
4: while n < Nfmax do
5: Fit/update a response surface model sn(p) using the
data points: Bn = {(p, H(p)) : p ∈ An}.
6: Determine the probability: Υ(n).
7: Generate trial points Ωn = {yn,1, . . . , yn,m} by:
8: (1) Select the coordinates to perturb.
9: (2) Randomly generate the trial points according to
the normal distribution.
10: (3) Project the trial points onto the domain {pi : 0 ≤
pi ≤ p¯,∀i ∈ KS} (if necessary).
11: Select the next iterate p(n+1) from Ωn that maximizes
sn(p).
12: Computeα∗(p(n+1)) by the smoothed best response
update algorithm, compute σ¯∗i (p(n+ 1)) by (18), and
compute H(p(n+ 1)).
13: If H(p(n+ 1)) > H(p∗), then p∗ = p(n+ 1).
14: Set An+1 = An ∪ {p(n+ 1)}, and reset n = n+ 1.
15: end while
16: Compute α∗ by the smoothed best response update
algorithm.
APPENDIX L
WEIGHTED K-MEANS ALGORITHM FOR AP SEG-
MENTATION
The AP segmentation problem deals with the set KS =
{1, 2, · · · ,K} of APs in the network. We use an attribute
vector yi to represent AP i. If we consider M attributes
of APs, then yi is a M -dimension vector. Let w =
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Figure 10. AP Segmentation Result (Five Groups) under β = 0.7
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Figure 11. AP Segmentation Result (Five Groups) under β = 1
{w1, w2, · · · , wM} be the weights for the M attributes. Ob-
viously, wm ∈ [0, 1],∀m = 1, 2, · · · ,M , and
∑M
m=1 wm = 1.
The weighted k-means clustering [31] searches for a
segmentation of the K APs into G groups, i.e., S =
{S1,S2, · · · ,SG}, which is:
arg min
S
G∑
g=1
∑
yi∈Sg
M∑
m=1
wm||yi,m − zg,m||2.
Here zg = {zg,1, zg,2, · · · , zg,m} represents the the centroids
of group g.
The AP segmentation problem is computationally diffi-
cult (NP hard). However, there are efficient heuristic algo-
rithms that are commonly employed and converge quickly
to a local optimum. Detailed algorithm can be referred to
[31].
APPENDIX M
AP SEGMENTATION RESULTS UNDER DIFFERENT
WEIGHTS
We do the AP segmentation under different weights. Specif-
ically, we segment APs under β = 0, β = 0.3, β = 0.5, β =
0.7, and β = 1. Recall that β is the weight assigned to
the network access evaluation parameter, and 1 − β is
the weight assigned to the location hotness parameter. AP
segmentations under different β are different. Figure 10
shows the AP segmentation result under β = 0.7 where
APs are segmented into five groups. Figure 11 shows the AP
segmentation result under β = 1 where APs are segmented
into five groups. We can see that when β = 1, the AP
segmenation only depends on the network access evaluation
parameter. However, when β = 0.7, the AP segmentation
depends on both the network access evaluation parameter
and the location hotness parameter.
